



A SUMMARY OF THE PRICE OF INTOLERANCE

A Socioeconomic Analysis of the White Supremacy
Movement and the Kungälv Model

Eva Nilsson Lundmark & Ingvar Nilsson

This report was initiated by the foundations Order of the Teaspoon and Expo and developed according to the framework for The Kungälv Model.

The report was financed with funds from the Stieg Larsson Foundation, Natur & Kultur Foundation and The Swedish National Board for Youth Affairs.

Report authors:

Eva Nilsson Lundmark

Eva.lundmark@krutab.se

Ingvar Nilsson

i.nilsson@seeab.se

Summary:

Susanna Kull

Photos:

Expo Foundation and the municipality of Kungälv

Graphic illustrations:

Ingvar Nilsson

Victoria Widmark

Graphic design:

Victoria Widmark

Editing:

Editorial staff

Scientific review:

Göran Dahl

Print:

Ätta.45 Tryckeri AB, Stockholm 2014

Foreword

Some people believe that our ability to lead and take initiative comes from crisis situations, when we are under pressure, and that may well be true. The municipality of Kungälv has experienced several such crisis situations, caused by extremists and perpetrators of violence. This is where John Hron was murdered on a summer night in 1995. This is where Kyriakos was beaten almost to death at a bus stop a year later and where, in 2002 in the same spot, a woman picking her daughter up from preschool was assaulted for the same reason by the same gang. Gangs have repeatedly faced off here, armed with clubs, knives and bats. All of the above are good examples of horrible crisis situations followed by lasting trauma and a call for action and leadership. But immediate actions, in the best case scenario, work only for the moment, rarely for the future. Torch-lit processions and town- and crisis meetings are not in conflict with long-range work but it is important to realize that true leadership has to do with setting the stage for longevity and perseverance.

When the first adrenaline rush has diminished and the shock and the grief have dissipated and memories begun to fade, we run the risk of forgetting the deep roots of these acts of violence. We start over and lose sight of the underlying cause of the problem. In what is now the municipality of Kungälv, Nazi groupings have existed from before World War II. On the surface, it looks as if they have come and

gone, but there is a latent continuity that in the 1990s contributed to the emergence of new groupings, the remains of which are still present today.

What led to the deadly assault of John Hron was a long series of extremely unfortunate events, but nobody would claim that it was surprising that it happened in Kungälv. This insight – coupled with the courage to admit responsibility – led to a very long-running project aimed at changing the structures that cause extremism in the local community from the very foundation. This work is not finished, nor will it ever be, but it is showing results. There are no active Nazi organizations in Kungälv and no informal gangs. It has taken many years to reach this point and a lot of time and money have been invested. It is therefore gratifying to be able to present this report that shows that the socioeconomic benefits of this work add up to more than a quarter billion kronor for a municipality the size of Kungälv.

In addition to this number there are things that cannot be measured in money, in the form of an increased sense of security, lessened vulnerability and – perhaps most important of all – less hatred. Community means fellowship and the greatest success of the Kungälv Model is its ability to get students with widely different backgrounds to sit down together, learn together and live together.

Magnus Gyllestad, city manager, municipality of Kungälv

Camilla Nagler, secretary general, Stiftelsen Teskedsorden - The Order of the Teaspoon Foundation

Daniel Poohl, CEO and editor-in-chief, Stiftelsen Expo - Expo Foundation

1. Introduction

On the evening of August 16, 1995 next to Ingetorpssjön (Ingetorps Lake) close to Kode outside Kungälv, 14-year-old John Hron is beaten to death by four older youth, all of whom have neo-Nazi sympathies. After having been kicked and beaten unconscious, John Hron is thrown in the water. This deadly assault can only be described as unusually brutal and consequently the perpetrators are convicted of murder and aggravated assault respectively.

This Must Never Happen Again

The murder of John Hron becomes one of the most shocking violent crimes with neo-Nazi overtones committed in Sweden in the 1990s and receives much attention. It's a horrific crime that understandably causes strong reactions and the call for society and decision makers to take immediate forceful actions. The decision makers in Kungälv realize early on that in order to prevent the terrible thing that happened that August evening from ever happening again, what is needed is a commitment to long-term initiatives and coordinated efforts. This is how the murder of John Hron becomes the starting point of a consistent effort in the municipality of Kungälv to counteract intolerance and racism. The chosen approach has been to get to the bottom of the reasons and the underlying forces in order to once and for all stop both the violence and the emergence of these types of extremist movements to which the white supremacy groupings belong. Under the name Toleransprojektet (the Tolerance Project), nationally better known as **the Kungälv Model**, the name we will use in this summary, work to eliminate the conditions under which this type of phenomenon emerges, has been ongoing since 1995. One effect of the work in Kungälv so far is that today we no longer need to work on getting young people to leave right wing extremist organizations – because recruitment of young people for this type of movement has basically stopped.

Our Task

Commissioned by Teskedsorden (The Order of the Teaspoon), Stiftelsen Expo (Expo Foundation) and the municipality of Kungälv, we have conducted a socioeco-

omic analysis of the Kungälv Model in the report, **The Price of Intolerance**. The purpose of the report is to describe the economic repercussions of an intolerant structure such as the white supremacy movement, and thereby also show the benefits of reducing or preventing such movements from emerging by applying the methods used in Kungälv. The purpose is to, in as detailed a way as possible, present a picture of the scope and distribution of the estimated costs to society caused by the violent acts of extremely intolerant movements. In a number of previous studies we have been able to confirm that violence in the public space causes large and ongoing costs to society, which directly and indirectly affects a large number of societal actors. In short, it concerns an enormous amount of our common resources.

In the report, we show this by adding one more dimension to the argument, one that often weighs heavier than a social or a humane argument – the economic one. Money talks – this is often the bitter truth. What we are doing is adding up the socioeconomic cost of initiatives aimed at prevention and longevity in order to reduce and prevent the emergence of white supremacy movements, and comparing this to the cost of doing nothing.

Our ambition is to get decision makers to understand the importance of adopting a social investment perspective regarding these questions and to see the potential of preventive and long-term initiatives. Using preventive methods to stop or reduce the emergence of extremely intolerant movements with violence as one of its main tenets is not only desirable from a humane standpoint, it is also, considering the alternatives, an extraordinarily profitable affair for society.

2. The Kungälv Model in Brief

The Kungälv Model was created in 1995 on the assumption that intolerant ideas exist in our society and with this, conditions for racism and other intolerance. It has to do with attitudes and values that are sometimes rather wide-spread. At their most extreme, these attitudes create ideal growing conditions for movements based on Nazi ideology and set in a white supremacy environment. The overriding task for the Kungälv Model has to do with the on-going and persistent job of influencing these collective attitudes. The focus for this working model has to do with challenging anti-democratic ideas and values in youth. The main goal is to get young people to see the value in participating in the democratic collective and to strengthen their resistance against destructive and intolerant behavior patterns. Our purpose is to alleviate social unrest and, in the long term, keep intolerance in check as well as counteract violence, harassment and bullying.

This Working Model Consists of Three Main Parts:

Splitting activities; to create a distance between the youth groups by focusing on the individuals (followers) connected to the core group. The core group members have invested heavily in their social prestige and by splitting the groups, the members lose the attention that is so essential to retaining their positions in the hierarchy.

Focus on the future; to systematically lay the foundation for a positive view of the future, in short, to get the young individual to see his or her role in a future society – in a social context as well as on the job market.

Resocializing activities; to help ensure that the young person's professional life and leisure time become a natural framework for a harmonious life as a citizen. One third of this model therefore has to do with offering different paths to a rich recreational life with opportunities to practice taking social

responsibility, an important building block for developing social competence.

Because of the success with the work of the Kungälv Model, Teskedsorden and Stiftelsen Expo are now working on spreading this model to other communities.

A Preventive Perspective

Initiatives against racism and intolerance can be approached from different perspectives. The reactive perspective is to deal with the problem when it comes up, with the goal that it not worsen, in the way you might try to get a smoker to stop smoking. A proactive perspective is to remove the conditions for the problem to ever occur, in short, making sure that nobody starts smoking. It is indeed the latter that the Kungälv Model is mostly known for, using preventive initiatives against racism, intolerance and gang formations. In addition, since there are always intolerant undercurrents in society that might, under the right circumstances, emerge, set root and start to bloom, the model stands for a long-term and consistent perspective, which means, in practice, a continuous and ongoing effort to eliminate the conditions for intolerance to set root.

We believe that understanding this latter proactive approach is essential to understanding the work that has been done in Kungälv and, if the circumstances are right, the work that might be done in other places in the country as well. That is also how we understand and explain the Kungälv Model in this report.




3. The Need to Eliminate the Conditions for Destructive Subcultures

Our society contains a great number of cultural patterns. Some of them are so unique that you might even talk about different kinds of subcultures, such as ethnic, religious, work-related, interest-based and geographic. Most of them are benign and have to do with identity and belonging. But some are destructive to the existing goals and values in society around them.

The graph below illustrates a number of such destructive subcultures.

Based on the mapping that BRÅ (the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention) and the Swedish Security Service (police) did for the period 1999–2008¹ we try, in the graph below, to summarize the crime panorama linked to the white supremacy movement on the topic suspicion of crime.



¹ BRÅ-report 2009:15, *Väldsam politisk extremism*.

For a ten-year period this group is suspected of committing an average of 6,500 different crimes. These crimes are divided among 845 persons who are around 20 years old by the time of their first crime. Most of the crimes (approximately 80% or just over 5,300) are non-politically motivated, an indication of something we have noticed earlier in our studies; life in a white supremacy environment tends to be a gateway to an asocial and/or criminal lifestyle.

If you look at the crime distribution among the individuals, it is evident that the average white supremacy person during this time period commits 1.5 politically motivated crimes and 6.6 non-politically motivated crimes.

The white supremacy movement also has its own particular beliefs of what is normal. This concerns, among other things, its relationship to violence, which is seen as a relatively normal part of daily life. Violence is used both in order to maintain discipline within the group, in other words infighting, as well as to defeat an adversary.


A few Socio-Economic Consequences

The white supremacy movement has major repercussions on society, something that we discuss continuously in the report, with

a focus on calculating the economic consequences. When we identify and put price tags on these costs, we learn that they are surprisingly high. We estimate that:

- An assault that leads to lasting but “moderate injuries” that manifest themselves as permanent cognitive deficits in the victim might generate societal costs of almost 5 million kronor. If the assault causes the victim to become permanently disabled, societal costs might add up to close to 50 million kronor over the victim’s life.
- A single white supremacy member with a low or average level of violence might, during a 10-15-year time-period generate societal costs of approximately 6 million kronor.
- One single white supremacy structure of 15-20 persons might, during a 15-year period, cost society up to 290 million kronor.


In the report we discuss and show how these costs can be calculated. This way we can also show, at least in principle, what it might be worth to avoid these costs.



4. A White Supremacy Movement – The Structure and the Members

The white supremacy movement is very much heterogeneous, both when it comes to degree of participation and ideological beliefs. As illustrated in the diagram below, a number of persons make up the ideological core of the movement. Some of them are strongly violence prone, while others prefer to distance themselves from practicing violence and instead become a part of the

group that in its leadership role calls for, and encourages violence. There is probably an even larger group of individuals drifting in and out of the movement, outside the core. Some of them join the movement because it legitimizes the use of violence. Generally, the need to belong to an outsider organization² seems to be a stronger determining factor than the actual structure itself. It



might possibly have to do with a basic human need for belonging and acceptance.

These different manifestations of violence that occur are caused by these different personality types that exist within and around the white supremacy movement.

Examples of Individuals Attracted to the Group


In the report we describe a number of more or less authentic cases of individuals and their journeys in and out of the white supremacy movement. Though we know

that each individual life story is unique there are a number of similarities between these cases of angry young men with a sense of alienation that the white supremacist movement attracts. The picture that emerges of the life of such a typical young man³ is illustrated in the diagram on the following page.

The diagram also shows turning points, when these individuals' journey toward alienation tend to accelerate, during the time in daycare when the young boy doesn't function like other children in a group, at the school-start when he has difficulty sit-

² See Janssen, *Personlig dialektik*, Liber, 1981 for an interesting discussion about the outsider concept.

³ This has also been confirmed by the state's research investigations concerning this question, SOU 2010:15.



ting still and concentrating, in the shift from sixth to seventh grade when the permanent classroom is replaced by the type of education in which a student moves from classroom to classroom, etcetera, until he finally, at the age of 18, leaves high school with failing grades and considerable difficulties establishing himself in the job market.

We might apply this description to a majority of those active in the white supremacy movement but there are exceptions, persons who are far from this “loser” picture that is often the go-to stereotype when describing outsider cultures. These individuals are often gifted persons with good communication skills and, not rarely, a high social competence. The reasons they seek out the white supremacy movement might be found in a(n):

ideological explanation; ideological roots come from similar core values in the immediate or extended family as well as the social networks to which the individual belongs.

social explanation; social networks and alliances have from an early age been characterized by intolerance and the sense of superiority signifying the white supremacy movement.

psychological explanation; the happy childhood and upbringing are just on the surface. In reality, childhood contained emotional misery and family members lacking in empathy.

psychiatric explanation; a fundamental personality disorder of, for example, a psychopathic nature.

When these different individuals emerge, stereotypes seem to clash with reality. Even if our job here is not to explore this paradox we feel it is important to point out these exceptions in order to understand the socioeconomic effects of not adhering to media stereotypes of the movement. It might lead us in the wrong direction when discussing preventive strategies.

We feel that the dynamics that bring different individuals into the white supremacy movement, despite nuances in their different lives, are surprisingly similar for the dozen or so persons that we meet in this study and have met earlier in studies of more or less organized outsider cultures. It has to do with an early and accelerating sense of not belonging and finding oneself alienated. Being a part of a white supremacy movement then becomes a way to belong and simply, to not feel ostracized.




5. Violence Affects Many People in Many Different Ways

Violence in the public space affects many people. There are victims, families, witnesses and society at large. There are perpetrators who, in turn, will suffer various legal consequences. In the report we focus primarily on the more direct socioeconomic effects on victims and perpetrators. These effects consist of three different main parts:

Loss of production; results from when people who would have been able to work full- or part time are not utilized and their contribution toward the gross domestic product is lost.

Welfare efforts; prevention, the care or rehabilitation of the person in question. This might consist of treatment and rehabilitation (healthcare) efforts, as well as efforts of a repressive nature (prison sentences). Destruction and damages incurred also belong in this category.

Support efforts; the costs associated with the support of marginalized persons. This might include anything from activity compensation and a-kassa (Swedish unemployment compensation) to disability benefits.



6. A Few Fundamental Principles Used in Our Calculations

We have established a number of fundamental principles for these socioeconomic calculations that we have worked with for the last thirty years.

The first one is the principle of caution, which means that when we calculate the cost of alienation and the effects of a preventive or rehabilitating initiative we always underestimate the result.

The second principle is the removal of anything that, while important, might be difficult to measure in our calculation. An example might be the indirect consequences for a family, or that which is known in economic theory as weakened social capital, reflected in society at large in intangible ways, for example by lack of trust and a sense of not feeling safe.

Since the uncertainty regarding the effects of various initiatives is so great, a third principle has to do with adding a risk calculation to the analyses of an initiative. This is a way to avoid the trap of exaggerating positive effects of an initiative. We ask questions such as, what would happen if we were only half as successful? We might also turn the question around by examining how successful we need to be in order for an initiative to make sense socioeconomically in five years, in twenty years, or even longer-term? A third variation is to ask the question: If we only succeed with one single participant, what socioeconomic effects would this have? These models adhere to both the principles of caution and transparency, with the goal that the reader be able to understand and critically evaluate how the results were achieved.

A fourth principle is to be aware of the fact that this has to do with volume, not exact results. The topic is too complex for anyone to claim an exact truth. Even


though our sample calculations are detailed the result must be seen as a representation of what the costs for an imagined course of action might be, without claiming that the details are exact.

The Corner Stones of the Calculation Model

We base our work with *The Price of Intolerance* on calculation models and data from earlier studies. Using these as a foundation we create an entirely new base model for our calculations, which allows for additional building blocks to be added continuously at the rate with which we acquire new knowledge. The calculation model can be used to figure out the cost of:

- Isolated situations, such as attack, assault, robbery, etcetera.
- Bigger events like large demonstrations, manifestations or confrontations.
- Following an entire lifespan of an individual, a “from the cradle to the grave” perspective.
- Following the history of events within a group of persons in destructive subcultures, a group or gang perspective.

In order to complete the socioeconomic analysis, we distinguish between these different effects and describe how they are distributed over a variety of areas, from somatic and psychological effects, to healthcare consumption, social and strictly economic effects. In order to show the costs of alienation we use the three-step model constructed for national economic analyses. This means, basically, that we identify and quantify the various consequences of alienation, in order to, in the end, put a price tag on them.




7. The Price Tags of Violence

Since our study has to do with the socioeconomic effects of intolerant structures and the white supremacy movement, the economic effects of violence are central. We adopt a wide perspective where the costs of violence make up a complex pattern of direct and indirect costs.

The Direct Costs of Violence

Preventive initiatives to stop violence are in the category of direct costs. These can be divided into two parts. The first one has to do with general initiatives to prevent violence. Examples are, offering anti-bullying programs in schools or hiring neighbor-




hood police officers. The second part relates to selective preventive efforts aimed at certain target groups or situations, such as ensuring police presence at football games or keeping violence in bars to a minimum.

The reactive costs of violence can also be divided into repressive costs and health care costs. Society's different initiatives to seize, restrict and punish those who perpetrate violence are a part of the repressive costs. As one might expect, care costs fall primarily on health care services and social services that provide somatic and psychiatric care as well as other forms of social support services for the victims of violence.

The Indirect Costs of Violence

Indirect costs consist of a complex accumulation of effects that are here divided into subtle and collective costs respectively.



Subtle costs might result from, for example, business owners having their stores destroyed resulting from collective violence at a white supremacist demonstration. We should add to this the loss of production due to violence. These results might be direct costs, since assaulted persons might not be able to work, or indirect costs,

which are difficult to measure and relate to phenomena like fear and insecurity. When people stay home rather than frequent bars for fear of becoming victims of street violence, that might represent an indirect cost.

Collective costs concern those things affecting a place where people live, a part of a city or an entire community. In a community with a lot of violence the value of the collective brand goes down. It leads to a sort of loss of goodwill that can be translated into money.

Costs That Show Us the Benefits

The costs for an initiative aiming to, for example, prevent some kind of violence fall directly on one or more societal actors. The possible benefits from those same initiatives are considerably more uncertain and will, if they materialize, probably be good for a number of different actors and emerge over a number of years in some unknown future. Sometimes these uncertainties lead decision makers to say preventive measures are too expensive. But what is too expensive? To act or to refrain from acting? By identifying and putting a price tag on what it might actually cost if we choose not to act, it is possible, at least on principle, to say how much it might be worth to avoid these costs.

In the same way that we use a number of cases to describe how a journey into and out of a white supremacy movement might look, we use the life stories of fictitious individuals or groups to calculate the costs associated with one victim of an act of violence, and connect this to the practice of violence by a single person or a gang.

Case 1 – Costs Associated with a Victim of an Isolated Act of Violence

Erik, a political leftist activist, becomes the victim of an assault by one or more persons from the white supremacy movement. He receives a number of hard blows to his chest and face, kicks to his stomach and toward his head. The blows render him unconscious and he is transported by

ambulance to the emergency room where he has to undergo a CAT scan of the brain. After waking he must stay in the hospital for observance. There is evidence of a cerebral contusion but no need for neurosurgical intervention. Since he does not exhibit permanent neurological injuries, rehabilitation does not seem necessary. The diagnosis is a severe concussion and after another twenty-four hours or so, he is discharged. Erik is on sick-leave for a long time after the assault. When he eventually returns to work he doesn't behave the way he used to, he has difficulties concentrating and problems focusing on a task for a longer period. He is periodically unemployed and on sick leave, sometimes with unemployment benefits, sometimes on welfare. Episodes of pain and depression make him a frequent visitor to health care clinics and polyclinic psychiatric wards. On

a social level, Erik has difficulties keeping friends. He spends more and more time in bars using alcohol as self-medication for his isolation. He never returns to working full-time but eventually receives permanent disability and is, in addition, a major consumer of different kinds of health care, somatic and psychiatric.

Erik's assault has caused latent, virtually invisible, brain damage leading to long-term or permanent cognitive disability, something that also shows up as a change in character. The economic effects of the assault are the different kinds of health care and rehabilitation efforts for Erik as well as the cost of support and loss of production after the injury.

In the table below the accumulated (summarized) costs for different time periods after the act of violence are described. The total costs during the first year after

The Long-term Costs for Victims with Cognitive Damages

| | 1 year | 2 years | 5 years | 15 years | 30 years | 45 years |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Employment Agency | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Social Insurance Agency | 100,000 | 189,692 | 370,554 | 840,488 | 1,275,675 | 1,517,320 |
| Municipality | 0 | 15,409 | 48,083 | 132,980 | 211,600 | 255,255 |
| County Council | 37,450 | 110,171 | 224,580 | 521,849 | 797,138 | 949,996 |
| Legal System | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Others | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Production Worth | 115,000 | 269,808 | 638,041 | 1,594,826 | 2,480,868 | 2,972,855 |
| Summation | 252,450 | 585,080 | 1,281,257 | 3,090,143 | 4,765,282 | 5,695,427 |

the assault add up to approximately 250,000 kronor. Most of this is loss of production and the cost of support for the victim while on sick-leave. Over a period of 45 years the total socioeconomic effects for Erik, converted into money, add up to just under 6 million kronor, which can basically be divided into three parts: First, the loss of production due to his cognitive disability, a total of approximately 3 million kronor. Second, his health care con-

sumption, which ends up costing close to 1 million kronor. And third, the costs for Försäkringskassan (the Swedish Social Insurance Agency) for covering the costs of sick-leave, disability and municipality welfare checks.

Case 2 – Costs Associated with a Single Individual's Acts of Violence

As a young child Henkan meets with great difficulties at school and he experiences a

sense of alienation from early on. He acts out and has poor impulse control, which leads to, during the middle school and early high school years, finding himself in many dramatic situations that often involve violence. A defining moment is when at the age of 13 he is humiliated and assaulted by a gang of boys with immigrant backgrounds. Shortly thereafter he comes in contact with and joins a white supremacy movement in his community. He participates in a number of unprovoked acts of

violence against ideological opponents. In a few of these attacks his opponents sustain subtle, though not disabling, injuries for life. Over the years Henkan becomes the subject of attention from both police and social services. His acts of violence lead to placements in various group/foster homes in his youth as well as arrests and disciplinary actions from the legal system later in life. The estimated societal costs of Henkan's actions between the ages of 15 and 29 are outlined in the table below.

The Socioeconomic Effects of an Intensely Violent Life in White Power 15-29 Years of Age

| Age | 15 | 16 | 17 | 22 | 15 | 29 |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|------------|---------|------------|
| Employment Agency | 0 | 0 | 0 | 45,595 | 0 | 199,386 |
| Social Insurance Agency | 18,766 | 36,810 | 1,504,000 | 3,611,496 | 18,766 | 6,048,810 |
| Municipality | 104,480 | 197,152 | 489,386 | 1,603,901 | 104,480 | 3,381,863 |
| County Council | 21,970 | 43,095 | 1,182,921 | 3,080,296 | 21,970 | 5,479,831 |
| Legal System | 42,056 | 82,494 | 164,832 | 2,141,493 | 42,056 | 5,721,112 |
| Others | 6,183 | 12,128 | 23,391 | 281,618 | 6,183 | 1,695,688 |
| Production Worth | 47,000 | 92,192 | 2,922,324 | 8,150,114 | 47,000 | 15,209,469 |
| Summation | 240,454 | 463,872 | 6,286,854 | 18,914,513 | 240,454 | 37,736,161 |

Socioeconomic Effects of a Violence-Filled Life in White Supremacy at Ages 15-29

Henkan, from our example above, gets to represent the small number of extremely violence-prone persons in the white supremacy environment, persons who are the continuous object of attention of the authorities. According to our calculations, because of his lifestyle he is, until the age of 29, responsible for societal costs of between 35 and 40 million kronor. Most of these costs fall on the Swedish Social Insurance Agency, due to costs associated with the victims of Henkan's various acts of violence. The county and the legal system both carry costs of close to 6 million kronor for the entire period. The very largest portion for both Henkan and his victims is the loss of production.

Case 3 - White Supremacy Movement Costs on a Gang Level

In the example above, we discuss and calculate costs associated with one individual's acts of violence. In reality, involvement in a white supremacy movement causes enormous repercussions on both group and societal levels, costs that are more difficult to show than individual costs. We do, however, attempt to do this in the report and we use, among other things, the price list from the police, as it has, for some time now, charged for its attendance at various events. By showing societal costs related to, for example, a confrontation between different groupings, we increase knowledge about what this type of event actually costs. Detailing these costs helps us see how they are divided between the different actors.

In the table below we summarize the presumed cost of a relatively modest police team consisting of forty police officers, four police dogs and a few hours of helicopter time. We learn that the price tag for such an event might be approximately 350,000 kronor.

Examples of the Commanding Cost for the Police for a "Moderate Sized" Commanding

| Police Commanding, Examples | |
|-----------------------------|------------|
| 40 Police Officer one Day | 294,400 kr |
| 4 Police Dogs one Day | 10,240 kr |
| 1 Police Helicopter 3 Hours | 45,600kr |
| Summation | 350,240 kr |

Is this amount then to be regarded as a small or a large cost? The answer depends, as always, on what you compare it to. But

let's just say that if the initiative prevents one single person from sustaining a moderate cognitive disability due to assault, it will have yielded a very good return. The problem is, of course, that we never know if this will happen. The calculation only gives us an indication of the range of the costs.

Larger confrontations bring, of course, even more extensive consequences than those in the example above. For the Salem police team in 2010 the cost for police alone, for example, came to 2,712,215 kronor.⁴ In the table below we show the likely total bill for this type of event.

As a conclusion to the discussion about the costs for a larger confrontation like the one with the 2010 Salem police team, the diagram below illustrates how the costs are divided in percentages between the various sectors of society. We then conclude

The Economic Effects of a Larger Confrontation or Demonstration


| | External Cost | AF | FK | Municipality | County Council | Legal System | Other | Production Worth |
|---|-------------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| The Commanding Cost for the Police Department | 2,217,000 | | | | | 2,217,000 | | |
| Destroyed Commercial Shop | 400,000 | | 50,000 | | | | 350,000 | |
| Moderate Battery | 179,000 | 0 | 36,000 | 0 | 56,000 | 6,000 | 3,000 | 78,000 |
| Permanent Damage | 5,000,000 | | 1,500,000 | 1,700,000 | 1,200,000 | | 600,000 | |
| One Person Convicted Once | 6,000,000 | 200,000 | 400,000 | 500,000 | 300,000 | 800,000 | | 3,800,000 |
| One Person Convicted Several Times | 8,000,000 | 100,000 | 500,000 | 700,000 | 300,000 | 2,600,000 | | 3,800,000 |
| Three Persons Arrested | 327,000 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 255,000 | 0 | 72,000 |
| The Rescue Service, the Social Service | 110,000 | | | 60,000 | 50,000 | | | |
| Prosecution Investigation, Police Investigation | 350,000 | | | | | 350,000 | | |
| Loss of Time and in Income in General | 140,000 | | | | | | 140,000 | |
| Summation External Costs | 22,723,000 | 300,000 | 2,486,000 | 2,960,000 | 1,906,000 | 6,228,000 | 1,093,000 | 7,750,000 |

⁴ Information from the office of the county police in Stockholm County.

that the largest cost is the loss of production that follows and negatively influences our economy and Sweden's gross domestic product. The costs for the legal system are almost a third of the total amount. The costs for the city, the Swedish Social Security Agency and the counties are approximately 10%.

The division of costs among various actors as a result of a serious confrontation or demonstration.

Average Annual Cost After 1 Year – Part



Case 4 - Costs Related to an Active White Supremacist Movement during a 15-20-Year Period

The end of the calculation report presents a description of a rather hard-core white supremacist organization. The group consists of a core of 15 – 20 people, and an additional 20 – 30 people who surround the core. Every year or every other year group members participate in some smaller manifestation which leads to different forms of

confrontations with ideological opponents and/or police. On a few occasions during this time period the group also participates in larger confrontations. The group uses violence on a regular basis, internal and external assaults as well as other assaults with hate crime motivation, as well as violence that on at least one occasion leads to disabling injuries. Long-lasting injuries that don't lead to disability occur approximately once every other year. A few of the incidents lead to prison terms, in most cases relatively short ones, in a few cases longer. During their youth years the perpetrators are the subject of state youth care and are sometimes placed in group/foster homes.

The gang consists of a total of 35 to 50 persons and the calculation below is based on, among other things, the following assumptions of this gang's activities during a fifteen-year-period:

- Two thirds are adults, not active on the job market, and half of those are supported by welfare and/or disability.
- Every other year one person is assaulted by this gang and sustains lasting though not serious injuries.
- Around twenty persons are moderately assaulted by this gang during the calculation period.
- Two gang members are sentenced to longer prison terms; around ten of them receive shorter sentences.
- Two gang members develop substantial addictions, one with criminal elements.
- The gang members become the subject of a number of collective preventive and repressive initiatives from society; county police, criminal intelligence, larger or smaller police teams covering various manifestations and confrontations, technical protective measures by society, added guards, field assistants, etc.


Another way to describe the group is to give an example of some typical individuals in the group. Altogether the group consists of 35-50 persons, of which:

- 2-3 persons are very violent individuals
- 5-7 persons are relatively violent individuals
- 8-10 persons are moderately violent individuals
- 8-10 persons are not very violent individuals
- 12-20 persons are non-violent individuals

The first two groups are responsible for most of the violence that occurs and also incur most of the legal ramifications. These two groups also have a relatively strong sense of alienation. Group three participates in lighter forms of violence while group four hardly participates in violence at all. These are young persons who are somewhat lost in life, perhaps failing at school and unable to enter the job market later in life. Group five participates in little to no violence at all but hangs around in the outskirts of the gang.

In the diagram below, the costs for this gang are calculated for a 15-year period, and add up to a total of 290 million kronor.

The Socio-Economic Effects of a White Power Movement During a Period of 15 Years



The table below illustrates how these costs are distributed over the years and how they affect the different societal actors. A considerable part of the cost, almost 60 million kronor, falls on the Swedish Social Insurance Agency. This is a result of alienation and the costs for support and healthcare for the victims of the white supremacy move-

ment, but also for the members themselves. The city and the county each incur costs of approximately 35 million kronor for this 15-year period. The costs for the legal system add up to 50 million kronor. In total, the greatest costs are those associated with loss of production, a total of 91 million kronor for this period.

The Socio-Economic Effects of a White Power Movement During a Period of 15 Years

| | 1 | 2 | 5 | 10 | 12 | 15 |
|-------------------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Employment Agency | 0 | 0 | 160,019 | 845,820 | 1,240,606 | 1,474,473 |
| Social Insurance Agency | 185,592 | 2,501,046 | 10,384,051 | 26,858,212 | 34,803,298 | 59,959,181 |
| Municipality | 809,156 | 1,699,691 | 9,187,891 | 20,561,250 | 25,929,672 | 34,565,032 |
| County Council | 255,240 | 2,278,425 | 8,782,710 | 22,280,030 | 28,723,510 | 36,375,670 |
| Legal System | 468,672 | 1,684,872 | 12,254,037 | 34,129,379 | 45,145,780 | 52,434,617 |
| Others | 47,792 | 220,669 | 1,595,620 | 5,500,938 | 10,311,542 | 13,668,123 |
| Production Worth | 482,400 | 4,506,334 | 20,540,876 | 57,445,709 | 75,750,768 | 91,778,442 |
| Summation | 2,248,852 | 12,891,037 | 62,905,205 | 167,621,337 | 221,905,175 | 290,255,538 |

Once again it becomes clear what it might be worth to avoid these costs.

Applying these Calculations to the Situation in Kungälv

How representative is a white supremacy gang like this one for the situation in Kungälv? As a part of the study, we enlist a project group in the city to map the individuals that they have met over the years.

Of approximately 450 participants that worked with the Kungälv Model, 368 can be identified on an individual level. Out of these, 213 can be categorized as to how prone to violence they are, according to the earlier division into five groups, where group one consists of the individuals most prone to violence. The result in the table shows that only a very few individuals account for most of the violence potential.

An estimation of the distribution of violence potential in the group of 213 persons.

| | Group 1 | Group 2 | Group 3 | Group 4 | Group 5 | Total |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|
| Number | 12 | 23 | 34 | 44 | 100 | 213 |
| Percent | 6 | 11 | 16 | 21 | 47 | 100 |

Thereafter the same analysis is conducted regarding the violence potential for a total of 126 individuals believed to be strongly

associated with the white supremacy environment.

A retroactive review shows that the target group from the Kungälv Model is roughly twice as large as the group that the above calculation is based on. And it has approximately the same distribution of violence between individuals as our calculation group does. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the calculation does not, in regards to this, exaggerate the effects of the Kungälv Model work. We are rather, based on the number of individuals, at a level that might only be half of the actual one.

Add to this yet another circumstance, the advantage of intervening during the early years. Our calculation group is based on a non-intervention alternative, in other

words, what might happen if nothing is done. Experience from other studies shows that the very build-up of violence potential among young people is at its most intense period between the ages of 15 and 22. Time and again we see that, during this period in life, there is a powerful acceleration period of alienation that sometimes doubles or triples the likelihood of violence in a person. It is therefore reasonable to assume that if one was to evaluate the participants of the Kungälv Model later in their lives, their levels of violence would most likely be considerably higher without the existence of this project.

An estimation of the distribution of violence potential in the group of 126 persons closely associated to the white supremacy movement.

| | Group 1 | Group 2 | Group 3 | Group 4 | Group 5 | Total |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|
| Number | 7 | 11 | 24 | 28 | 56 | 126 |
| Percent | 6 | 9 | 19 | 22 | 44 | 100 |



8. The Kungälv Model – A Social Investment with a Good Return

Based on a number of examples, we have discussed the cost of different forms of violence from society's point of view. We now bring this knowledge with us when we continue to calculate costs and benefits of the work done with the Kungälv Model.

The table below illustrates the approximate staff costs for one group of students in 2012.

In addition to staff costs, costs for excursions are approximately 10,000 kronor per student. There are also costs for materials and food during this work on the home turf, approximating 1,000 kronor per person. The student groups involved in the Kungälv Model usually consist of 24 individuals, and based on this estimate the cost per student comes to approximately 29,500

Costs for the Kungälv Model

| Occupational group | Function | Nr. of Hours | Hourly Cost | Total |
|--------------------------------|---|--------------|-------------|----------------|
| Responsible for Education | Project leadership | 450 | 280 | 126,000 |
| Teacher 13 | Responsible for students for Ytterbyskolan | 200 | 270 | 54,000 |
| Teacher 2 | Responsible for students for Thorildskolan | 200 | 270 | 54,000 |
| Teacher 3 | Responsible for students for Munkegårdeskolan | 200 | 270 | 54,000 |
| Recreation leader 1 | Group development | 180 | 250 | 45,000 |
| Recreation leader 2 | Group development | 180 | 250 | 45,000 |
| Student health/social services | Counselor | 250 | 260 | 65,000 |
| Total | | 1,410 | | 443,000 |

kronor. This can, on the one hand, be compared to the normal per student “school voucher,” which is often around 70,000 kronor, and on the other hand, to the costs associated with an active white supremacy movement.

If we then assume that approximately 450 students have come through this model over the years, at a cost of 29,500 kronor per student, we arrive at the sum (non-discounted) of approximately 13 million kronor ($29,500 \times 450 = 13,300,000$). So far, the benefits can be expressed in terms of preventing the rise of a white supremacy gang. One such gang might potentially generate societal costs of up toward 290 million kronor, twenty times more than what the work of the Kungälv Model has cost until now. Simple math shows that if the Kungälv Model in these fifteen years has reduced the negative effects of one such gang by 5%, we surpass, from a strictly economic perspective, a societal break-even point.

The Dilemma Is That We Can't Know for Certain How Things Will Turn Out

When taking initiatives regarding an activity concerning a white supremacy environment, a discussion about cost will often follow. Direct costs are often obvious and it is even possible to know who will pay for what. The benefits of an initiative are much more elusive and will probably affect

a number of different actors and be spread out for many years over an unknown future.

The crux is that we never know for certain if we have gained these benefits or if they will actually materialize. The only thing we can do, is show the costs of doing nothing, as well as show the effects of the Kungälv Model work that we believe we are noticing. We can never with any certainty claim that the Kungälv Model was the only factor leading to the decline of the white supremacy movement in Kungälv. But there are many indications. First of all, there is the fact that the Kungälv Model no longer has to focus on getting young people to leave the white supremacy movement (a reparative way of working) but can work preventively. There is basically no active white supremacy movement in Kungälv today and the work now concerns preventing the emergence of such a movement.

With this study, we are creating the means to compare the potential cost for an initiative like the Kungälv Model to the cost of doing nothing, that is, the price of non-intervention. It is then up to decision makers to weigh initiatives and risks against possibilities and benefits. Our goal with the kind of calculations we do in the report, is to, besides address social goals of fighting intolerant movements, consider in a clear and transparent way, the economic rationale behind such a decision.



9. Thinking Ahead and Recognizing the Value of Social Investment

The most important asset of a society is the people who live there and the way they relate to and treat each other. In economic theory this is called human capital and social capital. The latter reflects the trust, the relations and the confidence of a community. It indicates whether a community is seen as safe to live in, and it is also the foundation for economic development. In a community characterized by weak social capital, agreements are not honored, bribes occur and the citizens don't trust each other or authorities.

Intolerant structures and destructive subcultures have a way of carving away at the social capital, creating unsafe and unpleasant environments and thereby causing both short and long-term societal costs.

We believe that the work with the Kungälv Model contributes to strengthening the social capital in Kungälv. We also believe that there are other communities that would benefit from these kinds of social investments in order to build an even better community to live in, a community where relations, safety and trust carry more weight than they do now.

The socioeconomic calculation model that we work with in the report, *The Price of Intolerance*, helps us recognize and

understand this. It can be one of many tools to contribute to greater knowledge among decision makers about the cumulative socioeconomic effects of undesirable social phenomena. The model shows that the non-intervention alternative not only leads to undesirable social conditions but also to high and unnecessary societal costs. To sum things up, we would like to make the assumption that the work with the Kungälv Model has made a difference and still does; most noticeably for all the individuals who have participated and are participating in the project, but perhaps most importantly because the climate around questions of tolerance has changed in the community.

Our contribution is to increase awareness of the price of violence in the public space that the white supremacy movement is responsible for, by emphasizing and concretizing the enormous sums of our common resources that the victims of violence and the perpetrators cost. To stop or reduce, by using preventive initiatives, both the emergence of the subculture and the acts of violence that it generates, is not only desirable from a humane standpoint. It is also, if you consider the alternative, an extraordinarily profitable affair for society.

There is a high price for intolerance. Not only in human suffering – it also uses up an enormous amount of our common resources.

In the report, *The Price of Intolerance*, economists Eva Nilsson Lundmark and Ingvar Nilsson focus on the societal costs believed to be caused by white supremacist movements that engage in violence. Using a socio-economic cost estimate model, they calculate the value of preventive and long-term initiatives that could stop or reduce the emergence of this type of movement. They also compare the cost of prevention to what it costs *not* to intervene.

One goal with this report is to create an understanding and increase knowledge among decision makers in this country of the importance of having a social investment perspective regarding these questions. To expedite the step from thought and insight to action, the report begins with a real event, the murder of John Hron in 1995 in Kode outside Kungälv. This in order to show what might be accomplished by wise and brave decisions paired with preventive and long-

term work in a community, in this case, the municipality of Kungälv. As a result of the Kungälv Model, it is no longer necessary to try to get young people there to leave the white supremacy movement, since no young people are recruited anymore.

It is our conviction that other communities could benefit from making this type of social investments to build a better society. Not only is it desirable from a humane perspective, but with the right initiatives, it can also be a profitable affair for society.

The report *The Price of Intolerance* was created by Eva Nilsson Lundmark and Ingvar Nilsson, commissioned by Teskedsorden, Stiftelsen Expo and the municipality of Kungälv.

The report is available in its entirety and as a summary, to order/download from www.toleransprojektet.se

**For more information visit
www.toleransprojektet.se**